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Appellate Practice and Procedure
by Robert G. Boliek, Jr.*
In 2010 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
addressed a number of cases of significance to appellate practitioners,
including cases presenting issues of apparent first impression for the
Eleventh Circuit on questions of mootness and justiciability as well as
a number of such cases dealing with the preservation of error.' In
addition, the Eleventh Circuit decided a number of interesting cases
relating to interlocutory appeals of orders involving injunctive relief, to
questions of the finality of judgments, and to the timeliness of the filing
of a notice of appeal.
Perhaps the most interesting case from the standpoint of appellate
practice and procedure, however, was Davis v. Terry, which raised a
question of apparent national first impression: Does a court of appeals
have jurisdiction over the appeal of a habeas petition that the Supreme
Court of the United States has granted under its original jurisdiction to
issue the writ?' A close second is United States v. Irey,4 the first en
banc decision of the Eleventh Circuit to reverse a sentence for substantive unreasonableness under the abuse of discretion standard of review
articulated in Gall v. United States5 by the Supreme Court.'
Accordingly, this Article will first discuss Davis and the other cases of
note that relate to the Eleventh Circuit's appellate jurisdiction before
turning to cases that address various procedural issues such as the

* Attorney at Law, Birmingham, Alabama. Auburn University (B.A., 1980); University
of Alabama (J.D., 1986; M.F.A., 1999). Member, Alabama State Bar.
1. For an analysis of Eleventh Circuit appellate practice and procedure during the prior
survey period, see Robert G. Boliek, Jr., Appellate Practiceand Procedure,2009 Eleventh
Circuit Survey, 61 MERCER L. REV. 1017 (2010).
2. 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010).
3. Id. at 719.
4.

612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

5. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
6. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1165-66, 1180.
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preservation of error. The article will close with Irey's elaboration on the
abuse of discretion standard of review for federal sentences.
I.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Statutory Limitations on Appellate Jurisdiction
As the Eleventh Circuit has recently noted, "for this Court to exercise
jurisdiction over an appeal, our jurisdiction must be both (1) authorized
by statute and (2) within constitutional limits."' In Davis v. Terry,' the
Supreme Court had previously exercised its original jurisdiction to issue
a writ of habeas corpus,' and the Eleventh Circuit was confronted with
an issue of apparent national first impression: Whether the Eleventh
Circuit had appellate jurisdiction over the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia's denial of habeas relief after the
Supreme Court had transferred the petition to the district court for
findings of fact on the petitioner's actual innocence claim."o The
Supreme Court had not invoked this procedure in nearly fifty years,u
and as the district court noted, there was simply no legal authority
explaining what avenue of appeal was available to the petitioner after
it denied the writ, although the district court surmised that such an
2
appeal would be directed to the Supreme Court.'
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court, reasoning that,
because the petitioner had already exhausted his other habeas remedies,
the Supreme Court could have only issued the writ pursuant to its
original habeas jurisdiction; therefore, any appeal of the district court's
order had to be presented directly to the Supreme Court." In support
of this holding, the Eleventh Circuit also noted that it would exceed its
own jurisdiction under the relevant statutes governing habeas relief to
conclude otherwise: "If this court . .. reviewed the district court's order
A.

7. OFS Fitel, L.L.C. v. Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., 549 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir.
2008) (citing Druhan v. Am. Mut. Life, 166 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 1999)).
8. 625 F.3d 716 (11th Cir. 2010).
9. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009).
10. Davis, 625 F.3d at 718-19.
11. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. at 2 ("Today this Court takes the extraordinary step-one not
taken in nearly 50 years-of instructing a district court to adjudicate a state prisoner's
petition for an original writ of habeas corpus.") (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. In re Davis, No. CV409-130, 2010 WL 3385081, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2010).
The district court stated, "[flunctionally, then, this Court is operating as a magistrate for
the Supreme Court, which suggests appeal of this order would be directly to the Supreme
Court. However, this Court has been unable to locate any legal precedent or legislative
history on point." Id.
13. Davis, 625 F.3d at 719.
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at this juncture,... we would effectively be restoring his remedies in
federal court, in complete contradiction to the express intent of
Congress."" Accordingly, the petitioner's appellate remedy was the
contemporaneous appeal he had also filed directly to the Supreme Court,
and the Eleventh Circuit therefore dismissed the petitioner's appeal and
denied his request for a certificate of appealability.15
1. Appeals from "Final"Decisions. In Davis the Eleventh Circuit
was confronted with an appeal that had a highly "unusual procedural
posture";" much more commonly, the question of whether the court's
appellate jurisdiction is authorized by statute arises in cases when the
court must decide whether, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291," the appeal
taken is a final decision of a district court. Section 1291 is the
"workhorse" jurisdictional statute for the courts of appeals that
"generally vests courts of appeals with jurisdiction over appeals from
'final decisions' of the district courts."" Usually, "[a] final decision is
one that 'ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing more for
the court to do but execute the judgment.""'
In keeping with the finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, in Ryan
v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,20 the former United States Court of
14. Id.
15. Id. at 718-19.
16. Id. at 717.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
18. W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co. v. Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co., 566 F.3d 979, 984
(11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 203 (1999)).
19. Carpenter v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 541 F.3d 1048, 1052 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2007)), affd sub
nom., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009).
Notwithstanding this definition, a limited number of decisions are considered final for
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 despite the fact that they do not end the litigation on the
merits. These include collateral orders under the collateral order doctrine, see, e.g.,
Carpenter, 541 F.3d at 1052, and appeals from stay orders that put a litigant "effectively
out of court," see, eg., King v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 505 F.3d 1160, 1165 (11th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, in rare circumstances, a nonfinal order
may also be reviewed in conjunction with other appealable orders under the doctrine of
pendent appellate jurisdiction. See, eg., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d
1357 (11th Cir. 2007). In contrast to recent surveys, the Eleventh Circuit did not appear
to break any new ground with respect to these doctrines during this particular survey
period, although Thomas v. Blue Cross& Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 814 (11th Cir. 2010),
contains good discussions summarizing the court's approach to the collateral order doctrine
and the doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction. See id. at 819-20; see also Thomas v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 823, 831 (11th Cir. 2010) (related case discussing
the collateral order doctrine).
20. 577 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on othergrounds by Curtiss-Wright Corp.
v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1 (1980), as recognized in Bryant v. Rich, 237 F. App'x 429, 430
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Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2 ' held long ago that a party cannot be
allowed to manufacture finality by voluntarily dismissing claims without
prejudice in order to appeal an adverse judgment as to other claims.22
According to the former Fifth Circuit, such a rule would circumvent Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (F.R.C.P.) 23 by allowing
a party what was in essence a "piecemeal" appeal of some portion of his
claims despite reserving the right to pursue the dismissed claims at
some later date, thus undermining the interest in judicial economy that
both the finality rule and Rule 54(b)'s certification requirements seek to
protect. 24
In Equity Investment Partners,LP v. Lenz," however, the Eleventh
Circuit distinguished Ryan by holding that the court had jurisdiction
over the appeal of a partial summary judgment entered against the
plaintiff that was made final by the parties' stipulated voluntary
dismissal without prejudice of a defendant's counterclaim and crossclaim.2 6 The court did so on the basis that the voluntary dismissal in
Lenz "was not an improper attempt ... to manufacture a final judgment
to pursue an immediate appeal; rather, it was prompted by the district
court's refusal to permit [the defendant] to join an indispensable
party."" Thus, Lenz suggests that, even when the party seeking the
appeal participates in the voluntary dismissal, finality may not be
destroyed under the Ryan rule when a party can point to a legitimate
independent basis for the dismissal other than a desire to manufacture
that finality. 28
2. Appeals of Interlocutory Decisions. While "[iun general, the
final judgment rule permits an appeal to the circuit court only from a
final judgment," some statutes provide that appeals of interlocutory
decisions "are permissible .

.

. in certain limited situations."

A

familiar example would be an appeal from interlocutory orders relating

n.1 (11th Cir. 2007).
21. See Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that
decisions of the former Fifth Circuit decided before the close of business on September 30,
1981, are binding on the Eleventh Circuit).
22. Ryan, 577 F.2d at 301-02.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
24. Ryan, 577 F.2d at 302-03.
25. 594 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir. 2010).
26. Id. at 1341 n.2.
27. Id.
28. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding the Ryan rule not applicable when the appealing party did not participate in the
voluntary dismissal).
29. 19 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 202.0511] (3d ed. 2010).
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to injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).ao Consequently, an
interlocutory order explicitly denying injunctive relief is immediately
appealable.a" As the Eleventh Circuit reminded litigants in Edwards
v. Prime, Inc.," so too is an interlocutory order that has the practical
effect of denying injunctive relief, even when the order does not explicitly
do so, so long as the order also meets certain additional requirements.
In particular, "jlust because a district court's order has the 'practical
effect of refusing an injunction,' it does not automatically qualify for
immediate appeal under § 1292(a)(1)."3 4 Instead, such a practical
denial must also "threaten[] a serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence
35
[that] can be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal."
Otherwise, "the general congressional policy against piecemeal review
will preclude interlocutory appeal."36
In short, in cases of practical denials, as with orders that have the
practical effect of granting interlocutory injunctive relief, the court
"adhere[s] to the time-tested adage: if it walks like a duck, quacks like
a duck, and looks like a duck, then it's a duck."37 However, unlike
explicit interlocutory orders involving injunctions-whether they grant or
deny injunctive relief-and unlike interlocutory orders that have the
practical effect of granting such relief," a practical denial must at least
threaten serious injury that can be alleviated by appeal before interlocutory review will be permitted.3 ' As the court explained in Edwards,
"[slection 1292(a) is not ... a golden ticket litigants can use to take any
decision affecting injunctive relief on a trip to the court of appeals."o
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2006). Perhaps the most familiar example of an appealable
judgment that does not actually end the litigation on the merits is actually a creature of
the rules of civil procedure-a judgment properly certified as final under F.R.C.P. 54(b).
31. Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010).
32. 602 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2010).
33. Id. at 1290.
34. Id. (quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)).
35. Id. (quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
36. Id. (quoting Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79,84 (1981)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
37. Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1359 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting BMC
Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1337 (11th Cir. 1998)).
38. Such an order "must be a clear and understandable directive from the district court,
it must be enforceable through contempt proceedings, and it must give some or all of the
substantive relief sought in the complaint." Sierra Club, 526 F.3d at 1358; see also
Birmingham Fire Fighters Ass'n 117 v. City of Birmingham, 603 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir.
2010).
39. Edwards, 602 F.3d at 1290.
40. Id. Likewise, while interlocutory orders modifying injunctions are appealable under
§ 1292(aX 1), orders that merely clarify injunctions are not entitled to the golden ticket.
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Indeed, even a properly punched 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)4 1 ticket can be
immediately revoked by events in the district court, as Birmingham Fire
Fighters Ass'n 117 v. City of Birmingham2 amply illustrates.4 3 In
Birmingham Fire Fighters, the court dealt with another chapter in
decades-long litigation over discriminatory employment practices by
various governmental actors, specifically the appeal of an interlocutory
injunction that appointed two persons to a county personnel board in
order to insure the board's compliance with the district court's orders.
While the appeal of this interlocutory injunction was pending, the
district court resolved most of the claims in the underlying litigation,
entering final judgments as to those claims. This order included a
judgment making permanent the interlocutory injunction then pending
on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, and no party appealed this final
judgment." The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal of the interlocutory injunction for lack of appellate jurisdiction, noting that "[i]ntervening events can affect an appellate court's jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal" and holding that the order entering the final judgment
"stripped this Court of its jurisdiction over the . .. appeal because, when
a final injunction incorporates the same relief as an interlocutory
injunction, an appeal is properly taken only from the final order."
ConstitutionalLimitations on Appellate Jurisdiction
The fact that a statute confers appellate jurisdiction over the appeal
of a particular decision does not end the jurisdictional inquiry.47 As
noted above, the appellate court's jurisdiction must also be "within
constitutional limits," including the question of whether the decision
to be reviewed presents a live controversy: "The doctrine of mootness,
which evolved directly from Article III's case-or-controversy limitation,
provides that 'the requisite personal interest that must exist at the
commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its
existence (mootness).""'9 Thus, "[a] case is moot when it no longer
B.

See, e.g., Thomas, 594 F.3d at 831-32.
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2006).
42. 603 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2010).
43. Id. at 1254-55.
44. Id. at 1250. Indeed, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama characterized the case as "Dickensian." Id. at 1250 n.1.
45. Id. at 1253-54.
46. Id. at 1254.
47. OFS Fitel, 549 F.3d at 1355.
48. Id.
49. Frulla v. CRA Holdings, Inc., 543 F.3d 1247, 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Tanner Adver. Group, L.L.C. v. Fayette Cnty., 451 F.3d 777, 785 (11th Cir. 2006)).
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presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give
meaningful relief."so
Death of a party while an appeal is pending often moots the appeal.'
In Thomas v. Bryant," however, the Eleventh Circuit held that a
plaintiff's death after judgment in the plaintiffs favor, but before the
court had issued its decision, did not entirely moot the plaintiff's appeal
because the plaintiff's claim of attorney's fees presented a live controversy.53 Thomas involved a 28 U.S.C. § 1983" action in which inmates
alleged that Florida corrections officers unconstitutionally used chemical
agents on inmates with mental illnesses in contravention of the Eighth
Amendment's" prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment." After
a judgment in two of the inmates' favor was entered by the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granting
declaratory and injunctive relief, one of the inmates died while the
appeal of the case was pending." In a case of apparent first impression for the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that
although [the inmate's] death deprives us of jurisdiction to determine
the merits of his Eighth Amendment claim and the district court's
award of his injunctive relief, "[wihen plaintiffs clearly succeeded in
obtaining the relief sought before the district court and an intervening
event rendered the case moot on appeal, plaintiffs are still 'prevailing
parties' for the purposes of attorney's fees for the district court litigation."58
Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment as to the merits of the
deceased inmate's claims but allowed for the substitution of the inmate's
father with respect to the inmate's interests "in order to allow the
district court to resolve [the inmate's] motion for attorney's fees." The

50. Id. at 1251 (quoting Ethredge v. Hail, 996 F.2d 1173, 1175 (11th Cir. 1993))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Koblan, 478 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam)
(holding that the death of a criminal defendant mooted the appeal and required the
judgment of conviction to be vacated and the indictment dismissed despite a pending order
of restitution and despite a circuit split on the issue of whether such pending order
presented a live controversy under the doctrine of mootness).
52. 614 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2010).
53. Id. at 1294-95.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).
55. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
56. Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1293.
57. Id. at 1294.
58. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Diffenderfer v. Gomez-Colon, 587 F.3d
445, 454 (1st Cir. 2009)).
59. Id.; see FED. R. App. P. 43(a).
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court also noted, however, that any claim on behalf of the inmate for
attorney's fees for prosecuting the appeal had in fact been mooted by the
inmate's death because the inmate died before the court issued its
judgment.60
Mootness, of course, is just one strand in the over-arching concept of
"justiciabilty," "the term of art employed to give expression to th[e] ...
limitation placed upon federal courts by the case-and-controversy
doctrine." In United States v. Rivera," also a case of apparent first
impression for the Eleventh Circuit, the court invoked the broader
contours of the doctrine of justiciability to hold that it lacked appellate
jurisdiction over an appeal by a receiver who had been removed by the
district court for misfeasance in the liquidation of assets that had been
forfeited in a criminal proceeding. 63 In particular, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that an appeal raising the issue of whether the district court's
opinion removing the receiver had damaged the receiver's reputation did
not present a justiciable controversy in the absence of an additional
tangible injury.64
In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit reminded litigants
that "[wie review[] judgments, not statements in opinions, to respect the
limits of jurisdiction"' and that "[wie have never held that an appeal
of a professional who challenges only a finding of fact that is potentially
detrimental to .. . reputation is justiciable."'

Importantly, the

Eleventh Circuit also declined to follow the decisions of some circuits,
including the Fifth Circuit, which had held to the contrary, because
[m]ost circuits have declined to exercise jurisdiction over challenges to
naked findings of fact about even attorney misconduct because an order
to vacate statements or findings in a judicial opinion alone "would not
60. Thomas, 614 F.3d at 1294 n.3.
61. United States v. Rivera, 613 F.3d 1046, 1049 (11th Cir. 2010) (omission in original)
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. 613 F.3d 1046 (11th Cir. 2010).
63. Id. at 1048-49.
64. Id. at 1051-53.
65. Id. at 1051 (second alteration in original) (quoting Keating v. City of Miami, 598
F.3d 753, 761 (11th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Keating v. City of
Miami, 598 F.3d 753 (11th Cir. 2010), the Eleventh Circuit relied on this rule in the
context of an appeal involving the qualified immunity of government actors, refusing to
review preliminary statements in the opinion of the district court to the effect that the
actors had engaged in unconstitutional conduct in light of the fact that the district court
had ultimately held that the actors were entitled to immunity. Id. at 760-61. As such,
there was neither an underlying adverse judgment to review nor a proper collateral
order-as might exist when an application of immunity is denied-to confer appellate
jurisdiction on the Eleventh Circuit. See id. at 760-62, 761 n.4.
66. Rivera, 613 F.3d at 1051.
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usually affect any tangible interest, thus placing such an order outside
of our Article III power to decide cases and controversies."67
II. PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN THE TAKING OF AN APPEAL
Even when jurisdiction exists under a statute and there is no
constitutional bar to the exercise of the Eleventh Circuit's jurisdiction,
the procedural requirements for taking the appeal must be carefully
observed. These requirements can themselves be jurisdictional, and even
when they are not, the court will often decline to reach the merits if the
relevant procedural rules are violated. For example, "the timely filing
of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.""6
On the other hand, the timely filing of a notice of appeal in a criminal
case is not.6 ' This distinction arises because the time limit for filing a
notice of appeal in a civil case70 is based on a statute," while the time
limit for filing the notice in a criminal case is not, because that limit is
based solely on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure." As such,
under the analysis of Bowles v. Russell,3 which is premised on
recognition of congressional authority to establish the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, the former limits the jurisdiction of a federal court to hear
an appeal, while the latter is a court-adopted claims-processing rule that
does not represent a jurisdictional limitation."
In Advanced Bodycare Solutions, L.L.C. v. Thione International,
Inc., the Eleventh Circuit applied the foregoing analysis to conclude
that a notice of appeal filed in a civil case that was untimely with
respect to the final judgment could nevertheless be timely with respect
to the district court's order denying post-trial motions for a judgment as
a matter of law, for a new trial, and to alter and amend the judgment."
In particular, the Eleventh Circuit held that, even though F.R.C.P.
6(bX2)77 precludes an extension of time for the filing of such post-trial
motions, the non-moving party had forfeited the issue of the propriety

67. Id. at 1052 (quoting Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg. Co., 972 F.2d 817, 820 (7th
Cir. 1992)).
68. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
69. United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009).
70. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).
71. Lopez, 562 F.3d at 1312; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (2006).
72. Lopez, 562 F.3d at 1313; see also FED. R. APP. P. 4(b).
73.

551 U.S. 205 (2007).

74.
75.
76.
77.

See Lopez, 562 F.3d at 1311-13.
615 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1359 n.15.
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(bX2).
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of the district court's decision to extend the time for filing these motions
by failing to raise this objection before the district court.7 " Because the
notice of appeal was timely with respect to the order of denial as a result
of the extension, the Eleventh Circuit decided it had jurisdiction over
these aspects of the appeal.
In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that, because F.R.C.P.
6(bX2) was not based on a statute, it was a non-jurisdictional claimsprocessing rule and, accordingly, objections as to noncompliance with the
rule could be forfeited.o Thus, while the notice of appeal was untimely
with respect to the entry of the final judgment itself-a jurisdictional
matter that could not be forfeited-the notice was timely as to the order
denying the post-trial motions in light of the district court's issuance of
the otherwise unchallenged extension of time in which to file them.8 '
III.

PRESERVATION AND PRESENTATION OF ERROR

Issues not properly preserved in the district court or issues preserved
but not presented in the briefs on appeal are generally waived,82 with
some limited exceptions.' Indeed, "a litigant who fails in his initial

78. Advanced Bodycare, 615 F.3d at 1359 n.15.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. But cf Lopez, 562 F.3d at 1313-14 (concluding that the Government did not
forfeit its objection to the untimely notice of appeal in a criminal case by failing to raise
the objection in the district court on the basis that the appellate court, not the district
court, was the arbiter of compliance with appellate rules, which did not require the
objection to be made before the filing of the Governments merit brief).
82. See, e.g., Action Marine, Inc. v. Cont'l Carbon, Inc., 481 F.3d 1302, 1313 (11th Cir.
2007).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 492 F.3d 1219, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
(applying, in the context of the criminal "plain error rule," the distinction between
unintentional forfeitures of substantial rights by a failure to timely object, which are
entitled to plain error review, from intentional waivers, which are not).
In two cases decided in 2010, the Eleventh Circuit exercised its discretion to apply two
of five much more rarely invoked "civil" plain error exceptions to allow for appellate review
of issues not raised before the district court. In PrincetonHomes, Inc. v. Virone, 612 F.3d
1324 (11th Cir. 2010), the court reached an issue not otherwise preserved on the basis that
it presented "a pure question of law, in which the proper resolution is beyond any doubt."
Id. at 1329 n.2.; see also Brown v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160, 1186 (11th Cir.
2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (reaching issue on the basis that "its proper
resolution Iwas] beyond any doubt"). In addition to these two exceptions for purely legal
questions that should be decided to avoid injustice and questions that may be resolved
beyond any doubt, the Eleventh Circuit may also exercise its discretion to consider issues
not otherwise preserved when the appellant lacks an opportunity to raise the issue in the
district court, when the interest of substantial justice is at stake, and when the "issue
presents significant questions of general impact or of great public concern." Virone, 612
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brief even to allege an error waives the right to relief based upon that
allegation,"' including those cases "where a litigant 'fail [s] to elaborate
or provide any citation of authority in support of the . . . allegation.""'
In Jones v. Secretary, Department of Corrections," the Eleventh Circuit
applied these rules of waiver to deny a habeas petitioner's application for
a certificate of appealability in a case of apparent first impression for the
circuit." Although the court construed the application as arguing with
sufficient specificity four of the grounds the petitioner attempted to
raise, the court declined others on the basis that the petitioner did "not
provide facts, legal arguments, or citations of authority that explain[ed]
why he [was] entitled to a certificate on those other grounds.""
In Howard v.
Waivers, however, can themselves be waived."
Walgreen Co.,o also a case of apparent first impression, the court
concluded that the issue of the improper inclusion of additional grounds
for the granting of a post-judgment motion for a judgment as a matter
of law-as compared with the grounds relied on in the pre-judgment
motion-can be forfeited by the non-moving party's failure to object to the
inclusion of the additional grounds." In general, the failure to raise a
ground in a prejudgment motion for judgment as a matter of law waives
the right to present that ground in a post-judgment motion for judgment
as a matter of law.92 In Howard, however, the court decided that the
non-moving party forfeited its right to raise the issue of waiver on
appeal by failing to object to the post-judgment motion on this basis,
relying on the holdings of the other circuit courts of appeals that have

F.3d at 1329 n.2 (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Fernandez, 741 F.2d 355, 361(11th
Cir. 1984)).
84. Jones v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 607 F.3d 1346, 1353-54 (11th Cir. 2010).
85. Id. at 1354 (alteration in original) (omission in original) (quoting Flanigan's Enters.,
Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 242 F.3d 976,987 n.16 (11th Cir. 2002), superseded by statute, FULTON
CNTY., GA., CODE § 18-79(17) (2001), as recognized in Flanigan's Enters., Inc. v. Fulton
Cnty., 596 F.3d 1265, 1274 (11th Cir. 2010)).
86. 607 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2010).
87. Id. at 1354-55. The court held last year, in Pardov. Secretary,FloridaDepartment
of Corrections,587 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2009), that a petitioner that failed to raise an issue
in an application for a certificate had waived that issue for purposes of presenting it on
appeal. Id. at 1103. The court, however, does not appear to have previously addressed the
question of the level of specificity required to avoid the waiver of issues a petitioner has
at least attempted to allege.
88. Jones, 607 F.3d at 1353.
89. See, e.g., supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text (discussingAdvanced Bodycare
Solutions, L.L.C. v. Thione Int'l, Inc., 615 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2010)).
90. 605 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2010).
91. Id. at 1243-44.
92. See id. at 1243.
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considered this issue.93 "All of our sister circuits confronted with the
issue have held that when, as here, a party fails to raise the inadequacy
of a Rule 50(a) motion in response to a Rule 50(b) motion, that party is
precluded from raising the issue on appeal"
In United States v. Pilati," the Eleventh Circuit held that waiver can
also occur when a party fails to present an issue to the district court in
those cases when the district court is acting in an appellate capacity in
a criminal case tried to a magistrate judge, which was an issue of first
impression for the circuit." In particular, a criminal defendant can
consent to trial before a magistrate judge," and that defendant is
thereafter entitled to an appeal to the district court, when the remedy
is not a trial de novo, but for review in the district court that is
equivalent to review in a court of appeals." Any subsequent appeal
from the district court to the Eleventh Circuit is a second-tier appeal,
and after Pilati a failure to raise an issue on appeal to the district court
waives that issue for purposes of appeal to the Eleventh Circuit as
well.9 9
IV.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Assuming the existence of the appellate court's jurisdiction and that
such procedural requirements as the timely filing of a notice of appeal
or the appropriate petition have been satisfied, few issues are more
critical to the success of an appeal than the standard of review. "In even
moderately close cases, the standard of review may be dispositive of an
appellate court's decision."oo
Although the Eleventh Circuit clarified issues relating to the standard
of review in other contexts during this survey period,'0 ' in United

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. 627 F.3d 1360 (11th Cir. 2010).
96. Id. at 1363-64.
97. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(bX3)(A).
98. See 18 U.S.C. § 3402 (2006); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(gX2XD).
99. See Pilati,627 F.3d at 1364.
100. News-Press v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 489 F.3d 1173, 1187 (11th Cir. 2007).
101. See, e.g., Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 636-39 (11th Cir.
2010) (holding appellate review of sanctions under the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.), is conducted under the same abuse of discretion standard as under
F.R.C.P. 11, but under PSLRA district courts must make highly specific findings of fact as
to any alleged sanctionable conduct, and absent such findings, the Eleventh Circuit will
remand for their entry to properly review sanctions decisions); Richardson v. Johnson, 598
F.3d 734, 738-40 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding sua sponte dismissal of prisoner's in forma
pauperis claims against prison guard for failure to serve guard, who was no longer working
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States v. Irey,'02 the court, in the wake of Gall v. United States,os
rendered its most important decision to date elaborating on the standard
0
for reviewing federal sentencing decisions.o'
The holding in Gall
requires that an appellate court apply an abuse of discretion standard
to such decisions in a two-step process.'
First, the reviewing court
should "ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error."'0 6 Second, "Gall directs that 'the appellate court should then
07
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed."'
In Irey a divided en banc panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
below guidelines sentence as substantively unreasonable under Gall's
second step in a child pornography case in which the defendant "raped,
sodomized, and sexually tortured fifty or more little girls, some as young
as four years of age, on many occasions over a four- or five-year period"
and "scripted, cast, starred in, produced, and distributed worldwide some
of the most graphic and disturbing child pornography that has ever
turned up on the internet."0 s The majority, separate, and dissenting
opinions in Irey occupy some 113 pages in the Federal Reporter, Third
Series.1o' This fact alone suggests the struggle an appellate court
must sometimes face in making sense of its duty under Gall to both
defer to the judgment of the district courts in matters of sentencing
while at the same time insuring that the district courts do not abuse the
great discretion that they have in these matters. This fact also suggests
that Irey is not really amenable to the ready summary appropriate for
a survey such as this Article.
Nevertheless, at the risk of greatly oversimplifying what Irey means,
it is fair to say that, at its core, Irey emphasizes that a district court can
abuse its discretion when it improperly weighs or balances 1 o the
evidence relevant to the statutory factors a district court is to consider

at the prison, was abuse of discretion under standard of review recognized in Rance v.
Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009), in a case where a
prisoner provided sufficient information to identify guard, and there was no evidence that
server of process could not have verified guard's current address with reasonable effort).
102. 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
103. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
104. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1188-89.
105. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
106. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552
U.S. at 51) (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id. at 1190 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
108. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1166.
109. See id. at 1165, 1278.
110. See id. at 1189, 1192-94.

1084

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

in passing sentence."' Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit may conclude
that a district court abuses its discretion, not only if the district court
finds facts that are unsupported by the record11 2 or if the district court
ignores undisputed evidence that is relevant to those factors," but
also if the district court improperly weighs the evidence relevant to the
balancing of those factors, a key issue in Irey, in which many of the
district court's underlying findings of fact were credited.114
The dissenters in Irey felt that such an approach, though couched in
terms of review for abuse of discretion, actually constituted a resentenc1 s that was at odds with the deferential standard
ing by the majorityn
of review for abuse of discretion: "[Aln appellate court's reweighing of the
evidence or giving the facts a different construction-to grant something
in the record more or less value . . . and so to conclude that the record

overall weighs more heavily for a higher sentence-smacks of a kind of
de novo review ... ."16
In any event, as the first en banc opinion to overturn a sentence under
Gall on the basis of substantive unreasonableness,"' Irey is the most
authoritative statement of the law of the Eleventh Circuit to date on this
issue. Irey accordingly deserves the careful attention of any lawyer
challenging a defendant's federal sentence in the Eleventh Circuit.
0

111. See id. at 1184 n.13. The relevant factors are delineated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) and include such matters as the history and characteristics of the defendant and the
seriousness of the offense. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1184 n.13.
112. See id. at 1198-99. The Eleventh Circuit noted that "[t]he factual problem is ...
with the district court's implicit finding that child pornography . . . caused [the defendant]
to sexually abuse children" but declined to disturb this "clearly erroneous finding" given
the Government's failure to challenge it. Id.
113. See id. at 1190 (holding that "[tlhe failure to mention facts may well reflect the
district court's judgment that those facts are not important, but the importance of facts in
light of the § 3553(a) factors is not itself a question of fact but instead is an issue of law").
114. See id. at 1201. After crediting the clearly erroneous finding that pedophiles are
not acting in a "purely volitional" way when they commit their crimes because the
Government did not challenge this finding, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that this
"assumed fact cannot reasonably carry much weight" in assessing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factor relating to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the defendant's history
and characteristics. Id.
115. Id. at 1226 (Tjoflat, J., concurring specially in part and dissenting in part)
(concluding "we have assumed the role of resentencer").
116. See id. at 1272 (Edmondson, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 1194. The Eleventh Circuit noted that there had been only been four such
cases prior to Irey, and they were all panel decisions. Id. (citing United States v. Livesay,
587 F.3d 1274, 1278-79 (11th Cir. 2009); Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1183; United States v. Martin,
455 F.3d 1227, 1238-39 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Crisp, 454 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th
Cir. 2006)).

